Does Earnings Management Amplify The Association Between Corporate Governance And Firm Performance?:  Evidence From Korea by Kang, Sun-A & Kim, Yong-Shik
International Business & Economics Research Journal – February 2011 Volume 10, Number 2 
© 2011 The Clute Institute  53 
Does Earnings Management Amplify  
The Association Between Corporate 
Governance And Firm Performance?:   
Evidence From Korea 
Sun-A Kang, Kumoh National Institute of Technology, Korea 





This paper aims to examine whether earnings management strengthens the causal links between 
corporate governance and firm performance. It examines the association between corporate 
governance and real activity-based earnings management and extends it to firm performance. This 
study involves 1,104 listings on the Korean Stock Exchange and finds that real activity-based 
earnings management decreases if firms have a well-established governance system, and such 
earnings management could strengthen the causal link between corporate governance and firm 
performance as measured by Tobin’s Q. Our study results are the first empirical evidences that 
real activity-based earnings management is effectively controlled by a corporate governance 
system and that it has links between corporate governance and performance. This provides the 
importance of corporate governance which could effectively constrain real activity-based 
earnings management, such that eventually influences the firm’s performance. In particular, it 
provides useful insights into corporate structures in which ownership is highly concentrated. Our 
findings are of great importance for Korea, in which the predominant business structure for large 
enterprises is that of the chaebol (equivalent to the Japanese keiretsu), which consists of 
conglomerates of many smaller companies and in which the structure of corporate governance is 
that of owner control. 
 





he goal of corporate governance is to ensure the accountability of the manager through mechanisms 
that try to reduce the principal-agent problem. Whether a corporate governance system effectively 
works inside is dependent on how it monitors and controls firms and their management with a strong 
emphasis on shareholders' welfare. The role of corporate governance in financial reporting has received a great deal 
of attention recently, especially after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). Many researchers have 
examined whether some characteristics of corporate governance effectively constrain managers’ earnings 
management, such that their financial reporting renews public confidence, because SOX requires managers to 
rigidly enforce the corporate governance system for financial reporting at their own risk. Managers could control 
reported earnings by making accounting choices or by making operating decisions discretionally. Recent studies 
show that managers change their method to control reported earnings from accounting choice to real operating 
decisions, such as postponing a new project or cutting expenses (Graham et al., 2005; Cohen et al., 2008). Earnings 
management primarily influences firms’ performances and eventually may sacrifice the shareholders’ wealth. If 
corporate governance is effective, then managers’ discretionary accounting choices and arbitrary 
operational/investment decisions could both be reduced. It is just as well that enforced corporate governance, after 
the passage of SOX, reduces managers’ accrual-based earnings management. However, if renewed corporate 
governance doesn’t constrain the manager’s real operating decisions or investment decisions, then the firm’s 
T 
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performance will be damaged by the manager’s private interests. 
 
This paper examines the role of corporate governance in the context of real activity-based earnings 
management, first of all, and extends it to firms’ performance. If corporate governance influences real activity-based 
earnings management and strengthens the causal links between corporate governance and firms’ performance, it 
may be that real activity-based earnings management works as a mediator. We focus on board characteristics as 
corporate governance and consider three kinds of managers’ arbitrary business decisions, such as aggressive sales 
promotions, overproduction, and cutting discretionary expenses. For the test of overall effectiveness, a corporate 
governance index and combined measure of real activity-based earnings management are used. Both OLS and 2SLS 
regressions were employed to examine the association between corporate governance and real activity-based 
earnings management and whether it mediates between corporate governance and firms’ performance. 
 
The empirical results show that overall real activity-based earnings management is constrained by overall 
corporate governance, and the findings are the same when we control for endogenous problems among variables. 
Finally, we find that strong corporate governance reduces real activity-based earnings management, which results in 
an increase in firms’ performance. 
 
Our finding that real activity-based earnings management can strengthen the association between corporate 
governance and firms’ performance is, to the best of our knowledge, the first empirical evidence of such a 
relationship. Managers’ private interests that could have been pursued via real activities can be constrained by 
corporate governance in a comprehensive manner, given the relationship that was identified. Further, firms’ 
performance would not be damaged by managers attempting to pursue their private interests if managers’ real 
activity-based earnings management were overseen by corporate governance. The results of the study reported 
herein suggest that overall board characteristics effectively constrain managers’ real activity-based earnings 
management, which mediates between corporate governance and firms’ performance. In particular, the study reveals 
the importance of controlling managers’ arbitrary decisions in a weak governance structure and provides useful 
insights into corporate structures in which ownership is highly concentrated. Our findings are of great importance 
for the Korean situation, in which the predominant business structure for large enterprises is that of the chaebol 
(equivalent to the Japanese keiretsu), which consists of conglomerates of many smaller companies and in which the 
structure of corporate governance is that of owner control.   
 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE AND DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESIS 
 
Corporate Governance and Firm Performance 
 
Previous studies examine empirically the relationships between corporate governance and firm value. Most 
of those studies examine the roles of corporate governance by focusing on factors, such as the composition and/or 
characteristics of the board of directors or audit committee, and try to determine which factor effectively controls 
conflicts of interest between owner and manager. However, the results of these studies differ. Some studies support 
that performance improves as the proportion of external directors on the board increases (Baysinger and Butler, 
1985; Dalton et al., 1999; Baek et al., 2004), while other studies find that the proportion of external directors on the 
board is not related to performance (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Yermack, 1996; Kim, 2006). Those inconsistent 
results may be caused by an endogenous problem among variables. For example, firm performance may be the result 
of the efforts of previous directors and at the same time may be an influencing factor on how to choose subsequent 
directors (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). 
 
Previous work on corporate governance structures has also examined such matters as earnings management 
or management compensation. With respect to earnings management, studies have investigated, as measures of 
sound accounting practices, whether certain corporate governance structures improve the reliability of accounting 
reports (Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; Kim and Bae, 2007), the association of corporate governance structures with 
earnings management using abnormal accruals (Xie et al., 2003; Kim,2006), and the relationship of corporate 
governance structures with fraud (Beasley,1996; Beasley et al.,2000, 2001; Uzen et al., 2004). In particular, they 
report that accruals-based earnings management decreases when the proportion of external directors increases, when 
the size of the board increases, when the number of directors on the board who have a long experience with the 
International Business & Economics Research Journal – February 2011 Volume 10, Number 2 
© 2011 The Clute Institute  55 
company increases, and when the number of board meetings increases. Some studies also show that earnings 
management decreases when the independence of the audit committee increases or the number of meetings of the 
audit committee increases (Klein, 2002; Xie et al., 2003). These results suggest that as the board becomes more 
independent from the CEO, it would be more effective in controlling accounting processes. These previous studies 
all employ accrual-based earnings management, discretionary accruals, as a proxy of earnings management. 
 
Real Activity-based Earnings Management 
 
In order to meet target earnings, managers make accounting choices among Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP) and/or make operating decisions that deviate from normal business practices in an 
attempt to meet target earnings (Roychowdhury, 2006). The former is about managers’ accrual-based earnings 
management and the latter is about real activity-based earnings management. Recent studies report that managers 
prefer to use real operating decisions, such as postponing a new project or cutting expenses, to manage earnings, 
rather than to use abnormal accruals (Graham et al., 2005). These preferences seem to have been focused after the 
SOX Act came into force; that’s because accrual-based earnings management is easy to detect from outside, while 
management arbitrary decisions are more difficult to detect. 
 
Prior studies have been examined on the actual practice of real activity-based earnings management, such 
as sales of fixed assets or investment to avoid negative earnings growth and violating a debt covenant (Bartov, 1993; 
Herrmann, Inoue, and Thomas, 2003; Choi, 2004), and recent studies find that firms use multiple real activities to 
avoid reporting annual losses, such as giving price discounts to temporarily boost sales, overproducing to report a 
lower cost of goods sold, and reducing discretionary expenditures to improve earnings (Roychowdhury, 2006; Kim 
et al., 2008). The reason why real activity-based earnings management has gotten much attention recently is because 
of those economic consequences, which is worse than the case using abnormal accruals. Especially, empirical 
evidence shows that a manager’s abnormal activities have a significantly negative impact on future performance, 
earnings, and cash flow (Gunny, 2005; Kang and Chun, 2010). These studies identify high abnormal real activity in 
groups that are using portfolios and find that the manager’s discretionary actions negatively influence the firm’s 
performance. They find those negative impacts continue until three years after they are engaged in real activity-
based earnings management (Kang and Chun, 2010). This is meaningful because a strict regulation may have a side 
effect on the firm’s long-term performance. There are studies examining the relationship between accruals and real 
activity-based earnings management (Zang, 2005; Cohen et al., 2008). They report managers use real activity-based 
methods as a substitute, depending on their strategies. Specifically, firms that are facing a lawsuit or that have filed 
one tend to switch their earnings management strategies from accrual-based manipulation to a real activity-based 
one (Cohen et al., 2008). Recent studies also try to identify the incentive for real activity-based earnings 
management in capital markets, such as outstanding number of shares, external audit quality, or compensation 
(Cohen et al., 2008), and those characteristics of firms that are engaged in real activity-based earnings management 




Previous studies report that corporate governance controls managers’ accrual-based earnings management 
and/or may influence firms’ performance. However, the effect of corporate governance and the effect of real 
activity-based earnings management on firms’ performance have not yet been investigated. According to Graham et 
al.’s (2005) survey, firm performance tends to be lower when managers are engaged in real activity-based earnings 
management. Now we try to link the association between corporate governance and real activity-based earnings 
management and suggest that real activity-based earnings management mediates between corporate governance and 
firm performance, as in the causal nexus depicted in Figure 1.  
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Corporate governance and real activity-based earnings management 
 
Board members monitor management and their effectiveness in performing this task depends on the 
independence, professionalism, and activity of board members (Xie et al., 2003). Introducing a system of external 
directors
1
 or organizing an audit committee within a firm is a way of decentralizing a board’s responsibility and of 
ensuring that the board discharges its responsibilities properly. Empirical research has shown that both the size of 
the board and the number of board meetings affect accrual-based earnings management. The possibility of earnings 
management, whether accrual-based or real activity-based, may have a negative effect on shareholders’ accurate 
access to the true value of the firm and may eventually influence the long-run performance of the firm in response to 
shocks. Similarly to the case of accrual-based earnings management, boards are charged with monitoring managers 
to protect shareholders’ interests. Managers’ abnormal real operational/investment activities are performed in the 
course of the internal decision process and most of them have to be discussed or approved by the board. That being 
the case, we expect that the composition of the board will influence whether or not a company engages in earnings 
management, measured by both abnormal accruals and abnormal real activity. Therefore, real activity-based 
earnings management could be influenced by board characteristics, such as size, activity, and independence, either 
directly or indirectly. 
 
Real activity-based earnings management as a mediator between corporate governance and firm performance 
 
Some studies find that real activity-based earnings management and firm performance are associated 
negatively (Graham et al., 2005; Zang, 2005). In this situation, if corporate governance controls managers’ abnormal 
real operational/investment decisions effectively, then corporate governance may have a positive influence on firm 
performance. Several studies report a positive association between corporate governance and performance 
(Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Dalton et al., 1999; Baek et al., 2004). These findings motivate us to examine whether 
real activity-based earnings management strengthens the causal link between corporate governance and firm 
performance. We expect that managers’ abnormal real activity amplifies the relationship between corporate 






In order to examine the role of real activity-based earnings management as a mediator, which amplifies the 
association between corporate governance and firm performance, we examine whether board characteristics 
influence real activity-based earnings management using multivariate regressions.  Then we analyze whether real 
activity-based earnings management strengthens the causal link between corporate governance and firm 
                                                 
1 Outside directors are defined as gatekeepers who have a responsibility to prevent corporate misconduct from its management 
and they are not employees of the company. 
Graham et al.(2005) 
Gunny(2005) 
Corporate Governance 






Baysinger and Butler(1985) 
Dalton et al.(1999),Baek et al.(2004)  
Yoon and Oh(2005) etc. 
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performance. 
We develop [Model 1] to examine these associations between the characteristics of corporate governance 





RM_Proxyit =  0+ 1CORP_INDEXit+ 2SIZEit + 3LEVERAGEit + 4ROAit + 5OWNERit + 6COMPENit 
+ 7OWNER_DUMMYit +  8~15Ʃ IND_Dummy + 16~17Ʃ YEAR_Dummy + eit 
where, 
 
RM_proxyit: The sum of Ab.OCF, Ab.PROD_cost, and Ab.EXP of firm i in year t (we multiply Ab.OCF and 
Ab.EXP by -1 so that the sum of the three variables will be indicative of overall real earnings 
management) 
CORP_INDEXit: The sum of B_SCALE, B_MEET, and OUTSIDE of firm i in year t (we multiply B_MEET by -1 
so that the sum of the three variables will be indicative of overall corporate governance) 
SIZEit: Natural log of total assets of firm i in year t 
LEVERAGEit: Debt ratio of firm i in year t (Total Debtit/Total Assets it-1) 
ROAit: Return of assets of firm i in year t (Earnings before taxit/ Total Assets it-1) 
OWNERit: Large shareholder’s ownership of firm i in year t 
COMPENit: Board of directors’ compensation of firm i in year t 
OWNER_DUMMYit: Indicator variable with a value of 1 if a manager of firm i in year t is an owner, 0 otherwise 
IND_Dummy: Industry dummy variables 
YEAR_Dummy: Year dummy variables 
 
We consider board size, activities, independence, external directors’ activities, and external directors’ 
professionalism as characteristics of corporate governance and use a corporate governance index (CORP_INDEX)
2
 
composed of individual characteristics that are significant. We also consider sales manipulation, overproduction, and 
the cutting of discretionary expenses as a proxy for real activity-based earnings management and use an aggregated 
measure (RM_Proxy). To make sure that our findings are robust, we consider endogenous relationships among 
variables.  
 
We control for firm size (SIZE), capital structure (LEVERAGE)
3
, and performance (ROA). In addition, we 
use the largest shareholder’s holding4 (OWNER) and whether or not a firm is owner-managed (OWNER_DUMMY) 
to control for ownerships. Finally, we use dummy variables (IND_Dummy and YEAR_Dummy) to control for 
internal director’s compensation (COMPEN) and for industrial and yearly effects that might exist. All these control 
variables follow previous studies regarding real activity-based earnings management. 
 
In the literature on corporate governance, there is concern about endogenous relationships among 
variables. Managers’ abnormal operational or investment decisions are both influenced by weaker corporate 
governance, yet also affect the structure of governance. To address this concern, we employ the following 2SLS 
regressions and control for endogeneity. Following a previous study (Bernard et al., 2006), we also consider a 
dummy variable for firms’ assets (SIZE_DUMMY) in addition to firm size (SIZE), because certain applications of 
Korean law depend on whether firms are large
5




                                                 
2 Corporate index is calculated by the process described in the “3.2 measurement of variables” section 
3 We use total assets as a denominator because using net assets may result in negative numbers, which can distort the continuity 
of a firm's debt ratio. 
4 Data are available from the TS2000 database of the Korean listed firms’ associations. 
5 Large firms those that have assets above 2 trillion Won have to have an internal audit committee. 
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 Stage: CORP_INDEXit =  0 + 1RM_Proxyit + 2SIZE_DUMMYit + 3SIZEit + eit  
2
nd 
Stage: RM_Proxyit = b0 + b1CORP_INDEXit + b2SIZEit + b3LEVERAGEit + b4ROAit + b5OWNERit  




SIZE_DUMMYit: Indicator variable with a value of 1 the if total assets of firm i in year t are equal to or above 2 
trillion Won, 0 otherwise 
 
We employ Baron and Kenny’s (1986) three-stage approach to examine whether real activity-based 
earnings management strengthens the casual link between corporate governance and Tobin’s Q, using the above 
findings as a basis. We review each mean value of the portfolio groups, using their corporate governance index as a 







DEPit= 0+ 1CORP_INDEXit+ 2RM_Proxyit+ 3SIZEit+ 4LEVERAGEit+ 5ROAit+ 6OWNERit+ 7COMPENit 




DEPit: RM_Proxy at the 1st regression and Tobin’s Q at the2nd and 3rd regressions of firm i in year t 
Tobin’s Qit = A ratio comparing the market value of stock with equity book value of firm i in year t [(Equity 
market value + liability book value) ÷ (equity book value + liability book value)] 
 
Measurement of Variables 
 
The characteristics of corporate governance that we consider are board size, activities, independence, 
external directors’ activities, and external directors’ professionalism. It is difficult to determine whether corporate 
governance is effective overall at controlling earnings management, because internal control factors are various and 
work together. In response to this difficulty, we make a corporate governance index (CORP_INDEX) composed of 
the significant individual characteristics
7
 found in the following model. 
 
RMit= 0+ 1B_SCALEit+ 2B_MEETit+ 3OUTSIDEit+ 4O_ACTIVITYit+ 5O_EXPERTit+ 6COMMITTEEit 
+ 7SIZEit+ 8LEVERAGEit+ 9ROAit+ 10OWNERit+ 11COMPENit+ 12OWNER_DUMMYit+ 13~20ƩIND_Dummy 




B_SCALE = Number of directors on board, which used as natural log form 
B_MEET = Number of board meetings, which used as natural log form   
OUTSIDE = Proportion of outside directors (# of Outside director ÷ # of total directors on board) 
Outside director = Firm’s board of directors is not current employee of the firm, regardless of an ex-employment 
in the firm 
                                                 
6 [Model 2] is composed of the approaches shown below, which were used by Baron and Kenny (1986).  
1st stage: RM_Proxyit = α0 + α1CORP_INDEXit +other control variables+ eit 
2nd state: Tobin’s Qit = β0 + β1CORP_INDEXit +other control variables+ eit 
3nd stage: Tobin’s Qit = γ0 + γ1CORP_INDEXit + γ2RM_Proxyit +other control variables+ eit 
If α1 , β1 , γ1, and γ2 are all significant and γ1 < β1 or γ1 becomes insignificant, then we may conclude that RM_Proxy strengthens 
the causal link between CORP_INDEX and Tobin’s Q. 
7 The results are consistent when we consider all components of the individual corporate governance variables used in the study 
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O_ACTIVITY = Simple participation rate at board meetings by outside directors  
O_EXPERT = Proportion of outside directors as financial experts (Financial experts = Professor in the field of 
accounting or finance, CPAs, or person who had consulting experience on finance) 
COMMITTEE = Indicator variable with a value of 1 if there is audit committee within firm, 0 otherwise 
 
We rank our sample into five groups based on each characteristic that is found to be significant in the 
above model; i.e., board size, activity, or independence, and assign 1 to 5 from lower to higher quintiles. Then we 
find their mean and get an equally weighted average score, which is the final corporate governance index.  
 
We consider sales manipulation, overproduction, and the cutting of discretionary expenses as a proxy for 
real activity-based earnings management. We use a single measure (RM_Proxy) combining
8
 these variables to 
capture overall effects of abnormal real activities. Firms that manage earnings upwards are likely to have one or 
more of abnormal real activities. We rely on previous estimation models for normal levels of real activities and 
regard abnormal levels of real operations as real activity-based earnings management. The abnormal level of each 
measure is computed as the actual level of a variable minus its normal level. We estimate normal levels of cash flow 
from operations, production costs, and discretionary expenses using a procedure developed by Dechow et al. (1998), 
as implemented by Zang (2005) and Roychowdhury (2006), and we run cross-sectional regressions for every 
industry and year as follows:  
 
OCFit/Ait-1 = a0(1/Ait-1) + a1(Sit/Ait-1) + a2(△Sit/Ait-1) + eit  (1) 
COGSit/Ait-1 = a0(1/Ait-1) + a1(Sit/Ait-1) + eit  (2-1) 
△INVit/Ait-1 = a0(1/Ait-1) + a1(△Sit/Ait-1)+ a2(△Sit-1/Ait-1) + eit  (2-2) 
PRODit/Ait-1 = a0(1/Ait-1) + a1(Sit/Ait-1) + a2(△Sit/Ait-1) + a3(△Sit-1/Ait-1) + eit  (2-3) 




OCFit: Cash flows from operations of firm i in year t, PRODit : COGS plus △INV of firm i in year t, COGSit: Cost 
of goods sold of firm i in year t, △INVit: Change in inventory of firm i in year t, DISCEXPit: Discretionary 
expenses of firm i in year t (Employee welfare + Advertising + R&D expense + Education and training), Ait-1 : 
Total assets of firm i at the beginning of year t, Sit : Sales of firm i in year t, ΔSit : Change in sales of firm i in year 
t(Sit - Sit -1), ΔSit-1 : Change in sales of firm i in year t-1(Sit-1 - Sit -2) 
 
We express normal cash flow from operations as a linear function of sales and changes in sales in the 
current period. Production costs are defined as the sum of the cost of goods sold (COGS) and the change in 
inventory (△INV) during the year. We consider the sum of employee welfare, advertising, R&D expense, and 
education and training expenses as discretionary expenses. The normal level of discretionary expenses is also 
expressed as a linear function of lagged sales, because modeling discretionary expense as a function of current sales 
creates a technical problem in that unusually low residuals can result if firms manage sales upwards to increase 




We used sample listed on the Korea Stock Exchange (KSE) from 2005 to 2007. Our sample restricted to 
nonfinancial firms and firms that have negative capital were excluded. In order to ensure homogeneity, each firm-
year observation was required to have a fiscal year ending in December and to have the data necessary to calculate 
the abnormal real activities used in this study. We truncated the top and bottom 1% of the distribution so that the 
results were not affected by outliers. Our final sample comprised 1,104 firm-year observations. Financial data were 
                                                 
8 We multiply abnormal cash flows from operations and abnormal discretionary expense by -1 to make it easier to interpret the 
results. Price discount or channel stuffing has a negative effect on contemporaneous abnormal OCF. Excessive price discount or 
overproduction leads to abnormally high production costs relative to sales. Cutting discretionary expenses leads to abnormally 
low discretionary expenses relative to sales. Each direction implying earnings management is not the same and we make it to the 
same direction. 
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obtained from the Fn-DataGuidePro database and ownership data were obtained from the TS2000. Data on 
corporate governance, such as board size, number of meetings, and the proportion of external directors, were all 






Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics on proxies for earnings management and other variables that were 
examined. The number of directors on the board (B_SCALE) is about 5~6 on average. The number of meetings 
(B_MEET) is about 16 times a year on average
9
. External directors account for 32.3% of the total number of 
directors (OUTSIDE) on average and their participation rate in board meetings (O_ACTIVITY) is 71.7%. About 
9.4% of the external directors are financial experts (O_EXPERT) and 16.3% of the sample firms have an internal 
audit committee (COMMITTEE). 
 
 
Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean STD 1Q Median 3Q 
RM_Proxy -0.016 0.165 -0.116 -0.016 0.084 
Ab.OCF -0.002 0.075 -0.051 0.001 0.044 
Ab.PROD_cost -0.018 0.109 -0.074 -0.011 0.044 
Ab.EXP 0.000 0.023 -0.010 -0.002 0.006 
B_SCALE 5.941 2.073 4.00 6.00 7.00 
B_MEET 16.27 12.90 8.00 13.00 20.00 
OUTSIDE 0.323 0.102 0.25 0.286 0.333 
O_ACTIVITY 0.717 0.288 0.50 0.813 1.00 
O_EXPERT 0.094 0.243 0.00 0.00 0.00 
COMMITTEE 0.163 0.370 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CORP_INDEX 0.599 0.525 0.20 0.60 1.00 
SIZE 19.33 1.167 18.44 19.14 20.07 
LEVERAGE 0.476 0.206 0.320 0.467 0.615 
ROA 0.056 0.071 0.019 0.054 0.094 
LOSS 0.151 0.358 0.000 0.000 0.000 
OWNER 0.372 0.175 0.234 0.361 0.489 
COMPEN 0.007 0.009 0.002 0.004 0.009 
OWNER_DUMMY 0.281 0.449 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Tobin’s Q 0.570 0.222 0.402 0.564 0.708 
Notes to Table 1: 
RM_proxy = Sum of Ab.OCF, Ab.PROD_cost, and Ab.EXP (We multiply Ab.OCF and Ab.EXP by negative one so that the sum 
of the three variables will be indicative of overall real earnings management) 
Ab.OCF = Abnormal cash flows from operations, Ab.PROD_cost = Abnormal production costs, Ab.EXP = Abnormal 
discretionary expenses (the sum of employee welfare, advertising, R&D expense, and education and training expenses) 
B_SCALE = Number of directors on board, which used as natural log forms. B_MEET = Number of board meetings, which used 
as natural log form. OUTSIDE = Proportion of outside directors (# of Outside director ÷ # of total directors on board), Outside 
director = Firm’s board of directors is not current employee of the firm, regardless of an ex-employment in the firm 
O_ACTIVITY = Simple participation rate at board meetings by outside directors. O_EXPERT = Proportion of outside directors as 
financial experts, Financial experts = Professor in the field of accounting or finance, CPAs, or person who had consulting 
experience on finance. COMMITTEE = Indicator variable with a value of 1 if there is audit committee within firm, 0 otherwise 
CORP_INDEX = Sum of B_SCALE, B_MEET, and OUTSIDE (We multiply B_MEET by negative one so that the sum of the 
three variables will be indicative of overall corporate governance) 
                                                 
9 Simply, this is the number of board meetings and we use log specification to mitigate heteroskedasticity when we run OLS or 
2SLS, including B_SCALE and B_MEET. 
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SIZE = Natural log of total assets. LEVERAGE = Debt ratio deflated by lagged assets. ROA = Return of assets (Earnings before 
tax/ Total Assets). LOSS = Indicator variable with a value of 1 if net income is below zero, 0 otherwise. OWNER = Large 
shareholder’s ownership which includes holdings of a majority shareholder, his or her family, and affiliated firms which have 
special relations with the firm according to Article 2 of the Securities and Exchange Act. COMPEN = Board of directors’ 
compensation which includes salary, bonus, and stock option. OWNER_DUMMY = Indicator variable with a value of 1 if 
manager is an owner, 0 otherwise. IND_Dummy = Industry dummy variables. YEAR_Dummy = Year dummy variables 
 




Table 2:  Correlations 
 RM_Proxy CORP_INDEX SIZE LEVERAGE ROA OWNER COMPEN Tobins’Q 
RM_Proxy 
 -0.154 -0.133 0.251 -0.453 -0.033 0.150 0.275 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.278 <.0001 <.0001 
CORP_INDEX 
  0.334 -0.006 0.088 -0.047 -0.110 0.001 
   0.839 0.003 0.123 0.000 0.965 
SIZE 
   0.176 0.170 -0.062 -0.429 -0.060 
   <.0001 <.0001 0.041 <.0001 0.049 
LEVERAGE 
    -0.185 -0.082 0.056 0.752 
    <.0001 0.007 0.066 <.0001 
ROA 
     0.045 -0.152 -0.426 
     0.135 <.0001 <.0001 
OWNER 
      0.022 -0.095 
      0.467 0.001 
COMPEN 
       0.100 
       0.000 
* Pearson correlations based on two-tailed tests 
 
 
Corporate governance measured by corporate index (CORP_INDEX) is associated negatively with real 
activity-based earnings management (RM_Proxy). Firm performance (Tobin’s Q) is correlated negatively with Firm 
size (SIZE), while correlated positively with debt ratio (LEVERAGE).  
 
Effect on Real Activity-based Earnings Management of Corporate Governance 
 
Table 3 reports the results of [Model 1], which examines the associations between the corporate 




 is significant and  1 shows a significantly negative sign (-0.036, P <0.001) and indicates that 
the overall strength of corporate governance constrains real activity-based earnings management efficiently. 
Regarding the results with control variables
10
, the debt ratio (LEVERAGE) is correlated significantly and positive 
with real activity-based earnings management. This suggests that firms that have greater debt are likely to be 
engaged in real activity-based earnings management. The association between a firm’s performance (ROA) and real 
activity-based earnings management is significant and negative, which implies that firms whose performance is poor 
are more likely to engage in real activity-based earnings management. Managers are likely to engage in earnings 
management, as measured by abnormal real activity (RM_Proxy), when the board compensation (COMPEN) is 
higher. Those results on control variables are consistent with correlations and previous studies.  
 
Hermalin and Weisbach argue that the variables board structure and performance are endogenous and find 
that previous studies on boards, the results of which are inconsistent, often neglect this issue. We consider the issue 
by employing two-stage least square (2SLS) regressions and obtain results that are consistent with ours. These are 
reported in Table 4.  
 
                                                 
10 Multicollinearity is not an issue here and the highest VIF is 1.87. 
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Table 3:  Regression of Earnings Management on Corporate Governance (OLS Regression) 
[Model 1]  
RM_Proxyit =  0 + 1CORP__INDEXit + 2SIZEit+ 3LEVERAGEit+ 4ROAit+ 5OWNERit+ 6COMPENit 
+ 7OWNER_DUMMYit+ 8~15Ʃ IND_Dummy + 16~17Ʃ YEAR_Dummy + eit 
Coefficients Exp. sign  
 0 Intercept ? 0.071(0.78) 
 1 CORP_INDEX - -0.036(-3.91
***) 
 2 SIZE - -0.004(-1.02) 
 3 LEVERAGE - 0.149(6.56
***) 
 4 ROA - -0.913(-13.6
***) 
 5 OWNER - -0.006(-0.24) 
 6 COMPEN - 1.003(1.87
*) 
 7 OWNER_DUMMY +/- -0.0003(-0.03) 
 8~15 IND_Dummy +/- Inc. 
 16~17 YEAR_Dummy +/- Inc. 
F 48.8*** 
Adj. R2 24.0 
N 1,104 
Notes to Table 3: 
RM_proxyit: The sum of Ab.OCF, Ab.PROD_cost, and Ab.EXP of firm i in year t (we multiply Ab.OCF and Ab.EXP by -1 so that 
the sum of the three variables will be indicative of overall real earnings management) 
CORP_INDEXit: The sum of B_SCALE, B_MEET, and OUTSIDE of firm i in year t (we multiply B_MEET by -1so that the sum 
of the three variables will be indicative of overall corporate governance) 
 
 
Table 4:  Regression of Earnings Management on Corporate Governance (2SLS) 
[Model 1-1]  
1st Stage: CORP_INDEXit =  0 + 1RM_Proxyit + 2SIZE_DUMMYit + 3SIZEit + eit  
2nd Stage: RM_Proxyit = b0 + b1CORP_INDEXit + b2SIZEit + b3LEVERAGEit + b4ROAit + b5OWNERit + b6COMPENit         
+b7OWNER_DUMMYit + b8~15 Ʃ IND_Dummy + b16~17 Ʃ YEAR_Dummy +eit 
Coefficients Exp. sign  
b 0 Intercept ? -0.277(-1.78
*) 
b 1 CORP_INDEX +/- -0.18(-3.57
***) 
b 2 SIZE - 0.017(1.81
*) 
b 3 LEVERAGE - 0.142(6.16
***) 
b 4 ROA - -0.83(-11.75
***) 
b 5 OWNER - -0.004(-0.20) 
b 6 COMPEN - 0.907(1.74
*) 
b 7 OWNER_DUMMY +/- 0.005(0.59) 
b 8~15 IND_Dummy +/- Inc. 
b 16~17 YEAR_Dummy +/- Inc. 
F 39.3*** 
Adj. R2 20.1 
N 1,104 
Notes to Table 4: 
CORP_GOVit: Individual characteristic of corporate governance or aggregate index; B_SCALE, B_MEET, OUTSIDE, 
O_ACTIVITY, O_EXPERT and CORP_INDEX 
CORP_INDEXit: The sum of B_SCALE, B_MEET, and OUTSIDE of firm i in year t (we multiply B_MEET by -1 so that the sum 
of the three variables will be indicative of overall corporate governance) 
SIZE_DUMMYit: Indicator variable with a value of 1 if the total assets of firm i in year t are equal to or above 2 trillion Won, 0 
otherwise 
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In the first stage, we run real activity-based earnings management (RM_Proxy) and corporate governance 
aggregately (CORP_INDEX), where we control for firm size (SIZE) and size dummy (SIZE_DUMMY)
11
. We obtain 
a result in the second-stage regression that is consistent with our main results, even though each coefficient of 
corporate governance (CORP_INDEX), b1, is larger than the OLS coefficients in Table 3 and significant.  
 
Real Activity-based Earnings Management as a Mediator 
 
Finally, we examine the mediator role of real activity-based earnings management using the approach 
proposed by Baron and Kenny (1986) and suggest that it strengthens the causal link between corporate governance, 
as measured by the corporate governance index, and firm performance, as measured by Tobin’s Q. Table 5 shows 
the results. Panel A reports each mean value of real activity-based earnings management and Tobin’s Q, using 
corporate governance index portfolios as a basis. The lowest corporate governance group (Q1) has the highest mean 
of real activity-based earnings management (0.011) and the lowest mean of Tobin’s Q (0.527) among the groups. 
These results are consistent with the results of correlations and the OLS results, which indicate that corporate 
governance is associated negatively with real activity-based earnings management and associated positively with 
firm performance. The relationship between real activity-based earnings management and performance is negative.  
 
Table 5:  Mediator Effects of Real activity-based Earnings Management 








Q1(low) -0.133 0.011 0.527 
Q2 0.285 0.005 0.530 
Q3 0.590 -0.011 0.544 
Q4 0.913 -0.035 0.572 
Q5(High) 1.344 -0.060 0.587 
Panel B: Baron and Kenny’s Three-stage Approach 
[Model 2]  
DEPit =  0 + 1CORP_INDEXit + 2RM_Proxyit + 3SIZEit + 4LEVERAGEit + 5ROAit + 6OWNERit + 7COMPENit  






1st stage regression 2nd stage regression 3rd stage regression 
RM_Proxy Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q 
 0 Intercept ? 0.071(0.78) 1.010(12.8
***) 1.015(12.91***) 
 1 CORP_INDEX - -0.036(-3.91
***) 0.028(3.57***) 0.026(3.22***) 
 2 RM_Proxy - - - -0.075(-2.83
***) 
 3 SIZE - -0.004(-1.02) -0.038(-9.45
***) -0.039 (-9.57***) 
 4 LEVERAGE - 0.149(6.56
***) 0.804(40.4***) 0.815(40.3***) 
 5 ROA - -0.913(-13.6
***) -0.838(-14.3***) -0.908(-14.3***) 
 6 OWNER - -0.006(-0.24) -0.052(-2.36
**) -0.052(-2.39**) 
 7 COMPEN +/- 1.003(1.87
*) -1.284(-2.76***) -1.208(-2.60***) 
 8 OWNER_DUMMY  -0.0003(-0.03) -0.031(-3.64
***) -0.031(-3.66***) 
 9~16 IND_Dummy +/- Inc. Inc. Inc. 
 17~18 YEAR_Dummy +/- Inc. Inc. Inc. 
F 48.8*** 323.8*** 286.2*** 
Adj. R2 24.0 68.1 68.3 
N 1,104 1,104 1,104 
Notes to Table 5: 
Baron and Kenny’s (1986) three-stage approach to examining mediating effects 
DEPit: RM_Proxy at 1st regression and Tobin’s Q at the2nd and 3rd regressions of firm i in year t 
                                                 
11 An asset dummy that indicates large firms is considered in this study, following Black et al. (2006). Multicollinearity is 
insignificant. 
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The results presented in Panel B show that real activity-based earnings management strengthens the casual 
link between corporate governance and firm performance. If the significance of  1 of the third-stage regression 
disappears or is lower than  1of the second-stage regression
12
, we may infer that real activity-based earnings 
management strengthens the association between corporate governance and Tobin’s Q. The results accord with our 
expectations (t value, 3.22 < 3.57, where all  1 and  2 are significant). The results for other control variables are 
consistent with our main results. Thus, we confirm that managers’ abnormal real activity strengthens the casual link 
between corporate governance and performance. In a situation in which an inefficient structure of governance may 





Previous studies reported that corporate governance effectively controls accrual-based earnings 
management. However, the managers’ preference on earnings management tool has been changed from accounting 
choices to arbitrary business decisions after the passage of the SOX Act in 2002. There are also renewed interests in 
corporate governance since 2002 as a result of big accounting scandals, such as bankruptcy of Enron or WorldCom, 
so that a financial reporting gets public confidence again. If corporate governance effectively operated within a firm, 
then it constrained managers’ both accruals and real activity-based earnings management, which eventually 
influences shareholders’ wealth. This study examined whether earnings management is controlled by corporate 
governance in the context of managers’ abnormal real activity and whether it strengthens the casual link between 
corporate governance and firm performance. 
 
We used a corporate governance index as corporate governance and a combined proxy for real activity-
based earnings management in order to catch overall effects. Our results indicate that managers are less likely to be 
engaged in real activity-based earnings management when corporate governance index is high, and this is consistent 
when we consider endogenous problems among variables. Finally, using as a basis our findings and those of 
previous studies such that real activity-based earnings management has a negative effect on firms’ performance, we 
suggest that real activity-based earnings management mediates between corporate governance and firm performance 
(as measured by Tobin’s Q), thereby strengthening the causal link between them.  
 
This is the first empirical evidence that firms’ real operational or investment decisions could be influenced 
by well-established governance structure. Eventually, it may influence firms’ performance and managers’ real 
activity-based earnings management could amplify this link between corporate governance and performance. It also 
provides great implications to practitioners or policy makers of jurisdictions in which ownership is highly 
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12 Details are explained in footnote #9. 
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